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Introduction

On January 20, 1969, Richard Nixon’s ﬁrst day as president,
U.S.–European relations were at the lowest point they had been at any
time since the end of World War II:
• NATO was set to expire in 1969. The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,
its founding document, permitted members to leave after twenty years.
While it is safe to say that Atlantic leaders would not have let NATO
become obsolete, the situation did not look especially promising. One
founding member, France, left NATO’s integrated command structure
in 1966 and expelled the alliance from French soil. This dramatic move
left others to consider whether NATO in an era of détente served the
same purpose it did two decades earlier. There were serious doubts,
especially after NATO proved unable to agree on a response to the
August 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia;
• A series of currency crises had plagued transatlantic relations since
1958, when the total number of dollars in circulation eclipsed the
amount of gold backing them. This was a major threat to the stability
of the Bretton Woods system, which only got worse as the gap grew
between dollars in circulation and gold reserves. All that prevented
global ﬁnancial collapse (and a U.S. default) was a continued series of
clever American inducements to prevent Europeans from exchanging
dollars for gold, a right they had for accumulating U.S. dollars. A day
of reckoning neared;
• European integration was stalled. Charles de Gaulle refused British
admission to the European Community (EC) twice, blocked procedure
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in the European Council of Ministers, and withdrew French forces
from NATO’s integrated command structure, thus evicting the
Western alliance from French soil. The EC teetered on evolving into
an anti-NATO, anti-American inward-looking alliance.

Richard Nixon inherited this situation primarily because Lyndon
Johnson had spent the bulk of his time and political capital between the
Vietnam War and his Great Society initiatives. Nixon made it an early
priority of his presidency to redress the situation. Transatlantic relations
were one of the few issues other than Vietnam, China, and the Soviet
Union handled personally by President Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Both
men had long experience with Europe, going back to the Marshall Plan,
the founding of NATO, and American support of the European integration movement. They believed in maintaining strong ties with traditional
American allies, especially at the beginning of Nixon’s presidency, when it
was important to show that he would not be obsessed with the Vietnam
War. Nixon was eager to demonstrate that the United States could be a
force for peace and constructive activity again and that not all of the
nation’s creativity and imagination had been sapped by the trauma of
Vietnam (an average of 200 American soldiers died per week in Vietnam
during the second half of 1968). Thirty days into his presidency, Nixon
made a tour of West European capitals on this basis and to plan an
American foreign policy that – in the future – would not be based around
a war in Southeast Asia.
Nixon ﬁrst publicly provided his vision of a post-Vietnam world in his
inﬂuential Foreign Affairs article “Asia after Vietnam,” published in
October 1967, more than a year before he reached the White House and
even before he was an ofﬁcial candidate for the nation’s highest ofﬁce.
Although many observers immediately picked up on a more ﬂexible tone
in the article toward the People’s Republic of China, he also hinted at the
changing nature of the transatlantic relationship. “During the ﬁnal third
of the twentieth century, Asia, not Europe or Latin America, will pose
the greatest danger of a confrontation which could escalate into World
War III.” Nixon signaled that the transatlantic relationship, which had
been based on two decades of American assistance and European reconstruction and integration would enter a new phase. The phase was based
on an assumption that the United States would soon enjoy a more peaceful
era with the Soviet Union, a key feature of the coming détente era.
President Nixon articulated this view further in Guam on July 25,
1969. In an informal session with reporters dealing with questions mainly
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about Vietnam and China, Nixon made some important revelations about
the way he saw the world and how he intended to govern. These remarks,
which became known as the Nixon Doctrine, were not limited to simply
the way he saw American Paciﬁc interests.1 They represented the ﬁrst
major revision to the Truman Doctrine in nearly a quarter century: the
United States was no longer willing to mobilize forces anywhere to defend
against any aggression. The simplicity in his language suggests that the
Nixon Doctrine was indeed meant to have application beyond Vietnam.
When Nixon said “we, of course, will keep the treaty commitments
that we have,” and “we should assist, but we should not dictate,” he
foreshadowed a new phase in transatlantic relations in which Europeans
would be expected to take on more responsibility in the areas of their
own defense, monetary and economic affairs, and political development.
Future American commitments would be appropriated on a more realistic
scale commensurate with a new era of reduced Cold War tensions.
Some have said that Nixon had no grand strategy and that the
Nixon Doctrine was never intended to be applied universally. These
same critics say that his remarks at Guam were intended mainly as a
vehicle to articulate his policy of Vietnamization. These are obvious
conclusions if one limits one’s view of Nixon foreign policy to Vietnam,
China, and the Soviet Union. However, to test whether the Nixon
Doctrine had application beyond Asia, we can see whether or not the
concepts of the Nixon Doctrine were applied to other areas of foreign
policy, such as transatlantic relations.
This work is not about every issue that transpired in U.S.–European
relations during Nixon’s ﬁve-and-a-half year presidency. It is, however,
about how, under Nixon’s watch, the United States’ most important
alliance evolved during a turbulent period of the Cold War and how the
vision of foreign policy provided by Nixon in his Foreign Affairs article
and Guam remarks played out in terms of policy. In each of the ﬁve key
facets of transatlantic relations explored in this study – the future of
NATO, the collapse of Bretton Woods, the Year of Europe, American
1

Some scholars, such as Jeffrey Kimball, have argued the opposite. See Jeffrey Kimball,
“The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding.” Presidential Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 36, No. 1 (March 2006): 59–74. Kimball’s article was written before the National
Archives released Nixon tapes and other records that document how Nixon believed the
Nixon Doctrine had application not only to U.S. policy toward Europe, but to other parts
of the non-Vietnam world as well. In recent years, a new wave of scholarship is willing to
concede more to the idea of a Nixon-Kissinger grand strategy, which “achieved much.”
For example, see Dan Caldwell, “The Legitimation of the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design
and Grand Strategy.” Diplomatic History 33:4 (September 2009): 633–652.
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support for European integration, and the Anglo-American “special
relationship” – Nixon demonstrated a vision, one that was carried out
by Henry Kissinger. To show the importance that Nixon ascribed to
these issues, they were among the handful of issues – in addition to
Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union – that he and Kissinger handled
personally.
In each of these areas of transatlantic relations, Nixon made his mark
with a bold new initiative, guided by the principles of the Nixon Doctrine.
He made this clear to European leaders a month into his presidency, long
before his Guam remarks, and also during his April 1969 address on the
twentieth anniversary of NATO:
• After a period of neglect during the 1960s, Nixon came to power and
prioritized the strengthening of the NATO alliance. Although formally
reintegrating France was not possible, he established bilateral defense
ties with France and repaired political relations with Charles de Gaulle.
Nixon shifted NATO’s purpose from collective defense to collective
security with the establishment of the détente era Committee on the
Challenges of Modern Society, which remains an important pillar in
NATO’s structure to this day;
• Nixon was the ﬁrst president with the boldness to say (and act on it)
that the United States should no longer shoulder the ﬁnancial burden of
Europe’s monetary system, especially since many European countries
had rebuilt to the point of being commercial competitors of the United
States by the time of his presidency. As a result of Nixon’s direct
involvement, the Bretton Woods system and the gold standard were
ended, which resulted in the birth of the modern age of globalization;
• In his proposed Year of Europe, Nixon called for a fresh commitment
to work toward a strong transatlantic relationship rooted in an
American relationship with both NATO and the EC. His guide was
the 1941 Atlantic Charter, a statement of democratic principles drafted
by Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt that served as a blueprint for the postwar world. Nixon wanted the EC to become more
outward looking at a time of inward development and expansion.
He believed that Europe should play a bigger role in the world, but it
should not develop in an anti-American direction;
• Addressing the Anglo-American “special relationship,” Nixon believed
that Britain was stronger in Europe than out, a key revision of
America’s closest alliance. He also believed the EC was stronger with
Britain as a member due to Britain’s longer engagement with the world
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than other Europeans. Nixon laid out the vision and then, following his
resignation, Henry Kissinger continued his policy under President
Ford, ensuring that Britain remained tethered to both the EC and the
United States, but especially Europe.
Despite Nixon’s better known breakthroughs with adversaries, transatlantic relations were transformed in each of these categories. Although
Nixon was not always eloquent and sometimes was guilty of being
distracted, rarely does a new presidential administration come to power
with such convictions about such a large part of the world. This transformation in transatlantic relations took place according to the principles of
the Nixon Doctrine, and Richard Nixon immediately set a new tone in
terms of foreign policy during the early days of his presidency.
The structure of negotiations that Nixon and Kissinger used, established as effective with adversaries, did not always work well with allies.
Too many times, Nixon and Kissinger saw more exciting opportunities
with China or the Soviet Union, and Europe was pushed aside. Because
they – and their immediate deputies – handled European issues personally,
this resulted in lost opportunities in cases where the State Department and
other parts of the civil service could have been better utilized. Many were
quick to mark détente as a failed experiment, but, at least in terms of
transatlantic relations, the failure was far more often in implementation or
execution than in a fault in the original idea. Still, by the mid-1970s, the
efforts depicted here resulted in a new era of diplomacy with Europe, one
that would not have been possible without the thinking of Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger.
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